



Securitization is not a word that can be found in
the dictionary but is heard with increasing fre-
quenCy in finanCial rnarkets. Securitization is the
process ofturning an otherwise illiquid financial
asset into a marketable piece of paper. The
securitization ofmortgages, automobile loans,
accounts receivable, credit card receivables and
a variety of other financial assets is a growing
practice in both u.s. and international financial
markets.
This Letter examines the causes of rapid growth
in securitization and evaluiltes the implications.
As we shall see, securitization increases the effi-
ciency of financial markets but also brings a spe-
cial type of risk and has important implications
for the structure of the banking system in par-
ticular.
Securitization
Securitization refers to the practice of creating
marketable debt instruments that are backed by
specifically designated assets. A mortgage-
backed security, such as those guaranteed by the
GovernmentNational Mortgage Association
(GNMA) for example, is backed by specific
mortgages on specific parcels of real estate. The
payments of interest and principal to holders of
such securities are supported by the payments
on the underlying loans. (Indeed, in the case of
GNMA "pass-through" securities, the payments
on the underlying mortgages are simply passed
through to the holders ofthe GNMA securities.)
Although securitization of an asset is, in some
sense, tantamount to selling the asset, the origi-
nal holder of the asset usually retains some
responsibilities related to the asset. For example,
the responsibility for servicing securitized loans
(that is, collecting interest and principal pay-
ments) may remain with the originator ofthe
loan. The issuer of a loan-backed security may
even guarantee interest and principal payment,
thereby retaining the responsibility to manage
default risk. In such a case, creation of a loan-
backed security involves "transfer [of the loan]
with recourse." Unlike a true sale of a loan out
of portfolio, transactions with recourse relieve
the issuer (such as a bank) ofthe securitized
asset of interest rate risk (the risk that changes in
interest rates will affect the loan's value) but
leave him with credit risk (default risk).
Securitization and financial intermediation
To understand better the causes and implica-
tions of securitization, it is helpful to relate
securitization to the process of financial inter-
mediation as it has traditionally been performed
by commercial banks and others. In general,
financial intermediaries facilitate the flow of
funds from savers to borrowers. They do this by
creating liability and asset instruments that
simultaneously satisfy the diverse needs of
lenders and borrowers,respectively.
Individual savers, for example, may wish to loan
out their funds in smaller denominations and for
shorter periods of time than borrowers may wish
to borrow. Among the services financial inter-
mediaries provide is the matching of small
denomination savers with large denomination
borrowers ("denomination intermediation") and
making long-term loans to borrowers using
funds provided by the short-term deposits of
savers ("interest rate intermediation"). In addi-
tion, because financial intermediaries loan out
deposited funds in a diversified manner, savers
implicitly enjoy some reduction in the credit or
default risk to which they would otherwise be
exposed.
Securitization, in contrast, involves savers
directly in the process of lending to borrowers.
Although financial intermediaries may originate
the securitized assets (such as mortgage loans),
in the end, securitization creates a direct obliga-
tion between specific borrowers and specific
lenders and is more nearly like direct placement
ofdebt. The extent to which securitization
occurs depends, in part, on how economically
the goals of savers and borrowers can be
achieved in this manner rather than through
financial intermediaries.
With modern electronic transactions technology
and with the growth of certain specialized finan-
cial markets, it has become increasingly easy to
synthesize the services of the financial inter-FRBSF
mediary in an "unbundled fashion," leading to
increased demand for securitized debt by savers.
Until recently, for example, it was difficult for
savers to avoid the interest rate risk associated
with making long-term loans directly.Today,
active financial futures and options markets per-
mit individual savers to buy directly the desired
degree of protection from interest rate risk in
specialized markets. Similarly, mutual funds per-
mit an individual saver to acquire relatively
small-denomination, diversified interest in debt
securities. Such developments make it possible
for savers and borrowers to satisfy their diverse
needs without employing a financial intermedi-
ary in the traditional sense.
Government protection and securitization
Various government policies also intentionally
or unintentionally encourage securitization. Cer-
tain securities backed by residential mortgages,
for example, are guaranteed against loss of prin-
cipal or interest by the federal government.
These guarantees make such securities - nota-
bly those issued by GNMA - easier tomarket.
They also promote an active secondary market
for residential mortgages that helps mortgage
lenders adjust the composition of their asset
portfolios.
Securitization also is stimulated, perhaps
inadvertently, by the implicit and explicit pro·
tection of bank liabilities that results from the
reluctance of policymakers to let banks fail. This
encourages banks to sell guarantees or recourse
services for securitized assets. These guarantees
-in the form of Standby Letters of Credit (SLCs)
or Recourse Notes - are essentially liabilities of
the bank and may therefore be perceived by the
marketplaceas enjoying some of the protection
explicitly afforded insured deposit liabilities. The "
result is that banks may be able to offer credible
guarantees more competitively thannoninsured
institutions. (Indeed, it was only very recently
that the Supreme Court ruled that SLCs are not
to be treated as insured liabilities.)
Deposit protectiononly encourages securitiza-
tion in general, but when combined with other
regulatory policies, it also encourages insured
financial intermediaries to sell their own assets
with recourse. The reason is that, under current
regulation, removing the asset from their port-
folios makes it easier for financial intermediaries
to comply with capital/asset ratios and, at the
same time, profitably increase their effective
degree of leverage.
Growthof securitization
Securitization is thus one manifestation of how
financial innovation - driven by technological
and other changes - is moving some parts of
financing activity awayfrom financial interme-
diaries. Even venerable securitized instruments
such as "pass-throughs" backed by residential
mortgages grew 40 percent between 1983 and
1985 versus only 20 percent and 17 percent,
respectively, for mortgages and commercial and
industrial loans (C&I) held in the portfolios of
financial intermediaries. The growth trend is
even more pronounced for the newer asset-
backed securities such as collateralized mort-
gage obligations (CMOs), and securitized auto-
mobile loans, commercial mortgages and credit
card receivables. Public offerings of securities
backed by automobile loans, for example,
reached approximately $1.5 billion in the first
half of 1986 - twice the volume in all of 1985,
and CMOs (a more complicated variant ofthe
mortgage pass-through) grew by over .3'00 per-
cent between 1983 and 1985.
It is interesting to note that the vast majority of
this securitization activity involves assets that are
directly or indirectly guaranteed by government
agencies or depository institutions. This is con-
sistent with the notion discussed above that
securitization to some extent is "subsidized" by
government policies or is the result oftighter
capital requirements on banks.
Such is not universally the case, however.
Recently, over$l billion in bonds backed by
commercial mortgages were privately sold with
a guarantee issued by an insurance company. In
addition, Standard and Poor's recently intro-
duced a system of rating the credit quality of
commercial mortgage-backed bonds.Thus, the
existence of direct or indirect government guar-
antees is an important but not exclusive contrib-
utor to the trend toward more securitization.
Pros and cons
Whether or not a particular class of assets is
securitized dependsupon whether a sufficiently
large and homogeneous population of assets
exists. Only when the market can "understand"
those assets can they be securitized econom-
icallyand then sold.Although many assets are potentially securitiz-
able, the virtues of continued rapid growth in
securitization are actively debated. One ofthe
benefits of securitization clearly is that it permits
more economical transfer of loanable funds from
savers to borrowers. Ifthis were not so, then it
would not be competitive with the other major
means of bringing borrowers and lenders
together, namely, direCt placement ofgeneral
debt obligations and financial intermediation.
For securitization to exist and grow so rapidly, it
must offer lenders higher rates of return and bor-
rowers lower costs of borrowing, everything else
being equal, than the alternatives.
Because securitization of assets requires rela-
tively homogeneous - and therefore standardiz-
able - assets, some also believe securitization
enhances competition in the underlying assets.
For example, the standardization of residential
mortgage loan features that is stimulated by
securitization presumably makes it easier for
mortgage borrowers to compare the mortgage
loan instruments available to them. The result,
some claim, is that the standardization also
enhances competition among mortgage lenders.
Others, however, see such standardization as
working to the detriment of at least some market
participants with needs not met by the standard-
ized securitizable asset.
A more important criticism is that securitization,
by separating the origination and servicing of the
asset from its ownership, may create an incen-
tive to perform slipshod analysis ofthe asset
when it is first originated or acquired. The orig-
inator of a loan that will be securitized (without
recourse), for example, has less incentive to per-
form a careful credit evaluation than the origina-
tor who holds the loan in portfolio. Although the
development of appropriate standardization or
rating procedures can help avoid this problem,
this potential for "adverse selection" must be
recognized by market participants, and is a
source of risk attending the trend toward securi-
tization.
Securitization and banking
The "unbundling" of intermediation services
also has implications for the structure of finan-
cial markets. In particular, the role and clientele
of commercial banks is likely to change as
securitization progresses. Increasingly, bank
assets will consist of loans to borrowers who are
unable to issue their own liabilities econom-
ically, whose creditworthiness is difficult for the
marketplace to assess, or whose liabilities are
sufficiently "nonstandard" as to be difficult to
securitize. In general, these are likely to be indi-
viduals and smaller corporations and businesses.
The ability of banks to participate in providing
components of the "unbundled" intermediation
services will depend upon a number of factors.
Because loan origination requires familiarity
with local market conditions and companies,
and loan servicingrequires continued contact
with borrowers, banks are likely to retain a com-
parative advantage over most other organiza-
tions in those functions. Their ability to provide
guarantee or recourse services competitively,
however, flows in part from the combination of
government guarantees and capital regulation as
currently implemented. Similarly, their ability to
provide interest rate risk management for bor-
rowers and lenders will depend upon howecoc
nomically these services can be provided by
banks versus their competitors in the brokerage
and underwriting industries, which also depends
on the extent of regulation.
In conclusion, the trend towardsecuritization is
a natural consequence of markets evolving to
provide fundamental financial services in the
most economical manner. Although the pace of
its development is contingent on an expanded
,scale of certain financial markets and the pace
offinancial innovation, securitization will con-
tinue to have an important impact on the rela-
tive role oftraditional financial intermediaries in
our economy.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 200,264 - 903 8,285 4.3
Loans and Leases1 6 181,789 - 853 7,941 4.5
Commercial and Industrial 51,880 - 563 - 394 - 0.7
Real estate 66,707 173 3,396 5.3
Loans to Individuals 39,128 - 32 4,805 13.9
Leases 5,638 22 258 4.7
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,752 20 - 369 - 3.3
Other Securities2 7,724 - 69 713 10.1
Total Deposits 204,964 -2,273 7,362 3.7
Demand Deposits 52,091 -2,004 5,153 10.9
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 48,174 11,954 17,092 54.9
OtherTransaction Balances4 16,545 - 153 2,725 19.7
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,329 - 115 - 514 - 0.3
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,632 - 162 2,422 5.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000or more 35,721 - 124 - 2,624 - 6.8
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 19,577 -2,059 - 1,295 - 6.2
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











, Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institutiondeposits and cashitems
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change